Arena’s engaging work seeks to explore the ideations surrounding the concept of libertas and how these ideas interlinked with political practices during the late Roman Republic. The author emphasizes Cicero’s oratory and other historical sources such as Sallust, Plutarch, and Dio, positing that a common understanding of liberty among political participants in this era corresponded to the notion of being free from the arbitrary authority of external forces or domestic factions. Freedom, as described, signifies more than merely not being a slave; it encompasses political aspects safeguarded by civic institutions and norms. However, this collective perspective on liberty experienced notable transformations, particularly in the turbulent 40s BCE, partly in response to debates over the senatus consultum ultimum (SCU).
The book appeals to two primary audiences. The first is composed of classical scholars and historians focused on Roman political culture and practices during the first century BCE, as evidenced by Arena’s references to scholars like Clifford Ando, Joy Connolly, and others. The second audience encompasses political theorists and intellectual historians who scrutinize republicanism. In this context, figures like Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit aim to articulate a distinctly Roman (or neo-Roman) interpretation of freedom, which revolves around the dichotomy of freedom versus slavery. In this framework, being free doesn’t simply mean freedom from interference but, more accurately, freedom from arbitrary interference. As articulated by Pettit, “enslavement and domination can exist without interference,” a fundamental principle that Arena’s work builds upon, tracing the importance of the liberty-servitude dichotomy within Roman republican discourse.
The book comprises seven chapters, with the introductory chapter outlining its broad objectives, while the final chapter serves as an epilogue that examines the aforementioned conceptual evolution. Arena’s first chapter asserts that “the strict dichotomy between libertas and slavery” underscored the essence of liberty in the Roman context of the first century BCE. Liberty was perceived as “non-domination,” a pivotal theme that Arena expands upon in Chapter 2, where she highlights that being free entailed a shared possession of essential liberties supported by political frameworks. These liberties, including voting rights and the legal principles safeguarding them, formed the bedrock of Roman liberty.
In Chapter 3, Arena elaborates that individual freedom was linked to the freedom of Rome as a polity, emphasizing that Rome was considered free when not subjected to external domination or control by any internal faction. Despite this common understanding, there was significant disagreement on institutionalizing this freedom, manifesting in two ideological camps: the optimates and the populares. Arena categorizes these factions as “families” of political discourse rather than fixed philosophical doctrines. Members of either group occasionally drew from both ideologies, demonstrating the fluidity of political rhetoric. Each faction recognized liberty as non-domination but differed on their methods for achieving it. The optimates posited that a mixed government was paramount for liberty, asserting that proper power distribution among political entities would prevent the rise of domination by any particular group or individual. Conversely, the populares championed the significance of the assembly and viewed equality as necessitating collective representation.
Building on the ideological distinctions, Chapter 4 investigates the “ideological discourse of the political debate,” focusing on key issues such as imperia extraordinaria, the SCU, and land distribution conflicts. An observable trend arises in which proponents of optimate rhetoric countered populares initiatives by appealing to liberty, and the latter similarly invoked liberty against optimate proposals. For example, those opposing land redistribution contended that the powers assigned to land commissions were antithetical to liberty. The potency of the shared notion of libertas became so pronounced that, as Arena notes in Chapter 5, elites invoked liberty for any serious political calculus, regardless of their actual intentions or beliefs. Ironically, depicting the SCU as vital for preserving liberty ultimately diluted the concept itself, for it justified situations where the rule of law was compromised, thus conflating freedom with a state of domination.
This ideological shift, notably propagated by orators, set the groundwork for Octavian’s actions under the guise of public interest. According to Arena, Cicero’s Philippics embody this conceptual transition, where he posits that true freedom aligns with virtue and justice, moving liberty beyond mere positive laws to adherence to “divine natural law.”
From a political theory standpoint, Arena’s book comes across as a significant contribution for a variety of reasons. Primarily, she convincingly argues that liberty was a central thread in Rome’s late republican discourse, articulated through diverse yet shared arguments. Secondly, she skillfully delineates the complexity and fluidity of libertas in political rhetoric while ensuring the concept remains firmly rooted in context. Thirdly, her work advances discussions on ideology by elucidating how political behavior was shaped through liberty’s invocation by those reinforced the status quo.
However, some aspects could be further developed. Although Arena adeptly details the rhetoric employed by political figures in their policy debates, she could provide more insight into why certain rhetorical strategies succeed while others do not. Also, the nuances of her epilogue would benefit from additional exploration, particularly regarding the “speaking community” concept and its implications for how the populace perceived the separation of liberty from the rule of law. There seems to be a more moralistic understanding of liberty present in earlier texts by Cicero, suggesting a complex interplay between moral and political dimensions of law that challenges the newer frameworks Arena discusses.
Lastly, reflecting on contemporary parallels to Arena’s discourse might illuminate the prospects of adopting non-domination as a universal principle today. While not a primary focus of her study, her engagement with modern theorists positions her work within the contemporary neo-republican discourse. Given the inherent ties between status, non-domination, and Roman identity, one might query how these elements translate into modern discussions surrounding liberty, particularly in light of issues like imperialism and colonialism that echo historical dynamics within Roman society.
Arena’s volume is invaluable to scholars of classics, ancient history, political theory, and intellectual history, offering insights into Roman political thought that resonate with present-day concerns.
